![]() ![]() Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. Theorie de l’ amour propre et de l’ orgueil. The weakness of reason and the function of Spinoza's model of human nature. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 94–113.īoukouvala, A. Formalisation of Damasio’s theory of emotion, feeling and Core consciousness. Accessed 1 June 2016.īosse, T., Jonker, C. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. New York: Little Room Press.īickle, J., Mandik, P., & Landreth, A. Yovel (Ed.), Desire and affect: Spinoza as pshycologist (pp. Nostri corporis affectus: Can an affect in Spinoza be ‘of the body’? In Y. New York: Little Room Press.īeyssade, J.-M. ![]() Yovel (Ed.), Desire and affect: Spinoza as psychologist (pp. Emotions and change: A spinozistic account. Massachusetts: The MIT Press.īen Ze’ev, A. Ickes (Eds.), The Social Neuroscience of empathy (pp. These things called empathy: Eight related but distinct phenomena. Jacobi questions that mirror neurons activity alone enables the observer to interpret onother agent’s intention, but he cannot deny that, in order to represent and understand the intention of another agent, it is nessecary to have our mirror neurons active.īatson, C. 2004) that there is a constitutive link between action-mirroring and third-person understanding and argues that it is not clear that a shared motor representation of another’s action turns into a shared motor representation of another’s mind or psychological state. Jacobi’s critique goes further and calls into question Gallese’s assumption (Gallese et al. Rizzolatti draws a further distinction between the ways an action could be understood, pointing out that, if the observer cannot map a perceived action onto his own motor repertoire, then understanding of the perceived action cannot be grounded in “ motor resonance” and the action can only be categorized on the basis of its visual properties, without any other meaning. 2001), mirror responses seem to reflect the observer’s motor expertise and motor familiarity with the other’s executed movements. As Jacobi points out, referring to Rizzolatti’s work (Rizzolatti et al. It is important to mention here Jacobi’s critique from a philosophy of mind perspective (Jacobi 2009) and stress the role of previous experience in mirroring perceptual responses to another agent’s observed movements. Keeping in mind the debate concerning how different levels of explanation can be related to each other or how different disciplines can form the context for interpreting neuroscience’s data, we attempt to promote an implicit dialogue between Spinoza’s psychological theory and the neuroscientific findings, supporting that is legitimate and necessary to examine these questions from the point of view of philosophy and formulate new research questions that can promote further theoretical and empirical study of the complex phenomena concerning human nature and society. Leading researchers in affective neuroscience argue for a theory of embodied cognition and recent research in neurosciences attributes human capacity for empathy to mirror neurons, recognising in Spinoza’s texts the philosophical roots of current scientific thinking on body, mind and feeling. According to Spinoza, this consensus is built upon the biological substrate defined by human body’s physiology, through the mechanism of imitation and is supported by empathy. Although, they are by their definition as particular things obliged to exist in society and create a minimum of consensus. ![]() Most human beings don’t know themselves, are not conscious of their affects and, even less, do they know what the affects of others are. In Spinoza’s philosophy affects illustrate the way human beings interact with each other and the world, where the necessary meetings with other particular things define their being and its expressions. ![]()
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